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out distributions at job separation, or when they fail to pay back loans taken out against their 
accounts. Although leakage has the potential to undermine a participant-driven retirement 
system, trend analysis shows that aggregate pre-retirement leakage is modest and trending down 
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1.  Introduction 
One potential downside of a participant-driven employer-sponsored retirement system is 
the possibility that significant “leakage” takes place before employees reach retirement. Leakage 
occurs when employees take withdrawals prior to retirement, when they cash out lump-sum 
distributions at job separation, or when they fail to pay back loans taken out against their 
accounts. Although it is possible that leakage could be undermining the account-based pension 
system that now dominates in the private sector, the analysis here based on a combination of tax 
return, administrative, and survey data suggests those concerns are probably somewhat 
exaggerated. That is, leakage from retirement accounts seems relatively modest from both 
aggregate time-series and cross-sectional distributional perspectives.  
The possible negative effect of leakage on retirement preparedness is receiving increasing 
attention, but it is important to remember that policymakers and retirement plan sponsors walk a 
fine line when it comes to preventing leakage.1  Participation in a DC pension plan generally is 
voluntary, and employees choose how much they contribute when they do participate. Studies 
show that when employees know they can get access to their funds before retirement they are 
more likely to participate in the first place, and they contribute more when they do participate.2
                                                 
1 See, for example, recent studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009), U.S. Congressional 
Research Service (2009), Butrica, et al. (2010), and Davis, et al. (2010).  
 
Lawmakers have acknowledged this and made it clear that they understand employees will 
sometimes desire access to their savings before retirement for legitimate reasons. Thus, although 
pre-retirement withdrawals are discouraged by a 10 percent penalty on top of the income tax 
2 For example, Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor (2000) use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to show that 
participation is higher if participants can get access to their funds before retirement. That study also contains an 
extensive list of references to other papers that make the same basic point about how access to funds before 
retirement increases participation and/or contributions conditional on participating. Holden and VanDerhei (2001) 
analyze recordkeeper data and find that the presence of a loan provision increases 401(k) participants’ contributions. 
Holden, Brady, and Hadley (2005) contains additional references to loan research literature. It is also worth noting 
that recent advances in pension plans, such as the more widespread use of auto enrollment, may affect the extent to 
which loan and withdrawal availability affects participation going forward.  
owed, withdrawals from retirement plans and IRAs are not prohibited. Congress has even 
expanded the reasons for non-penalized withdrawals in recent years to include, for example, 
first-time home purchase, educational expenses, and certain emergencies, reducing the tax 
consequences of accessing retirement assets at younger ages.3
Given the trade-off between participation and potential pre-retirement leakage, the public 
policy question to address is whether the provisions that allow leakage might be undermining the 
U.S. pension system, both generally and for specific subsets of the population. One approach to 
answer the question is to analyze aggregate net inflows. In any given year, new contributions are 
flowing into the system. At the same time, money is leaving the system as benefit payments, 
loans, or withdrawals. Leakage is the subset of the outflows that occurs prior to retirement. 
Current contributions to DC pensions by employers and employees are quite high; as a share of 
employee compensation, total pension contributions in the private sector have been higher in the 
past few years than they ever have been (Clark and Sabelhaus, 2009). However, the only way to 
know whether or not a given level of contributions will generate adequate retirement incomes is 
to take leakage seriously, and to acknowledge that some of the money flowing into retirement 
accounts will leak out (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2007).
  
4
                                                 
3 There are several dimensions to the tax code rules affecting retirement plan leakage, varying across pension types 
(DB or DC) and IRAs, and the basis for the withdrawal. DB plans do not permit pre-retirement withdrawals, but DC 
plans are allowed to permit hardship and in-service withdrawals, and of course money can be taken out of an IRA at 
any time. Withdrawals at job change are allowed under both DB and DC, assuming the plan offers lump-sum 
distributions. DC plans also have another possible source of leakage, which is failure to repay loans, assuming the 
plan offered a loan option in the first place. In general, a 10 percent penalty is assessed on the taxable portion of 
pension and IRA withdrawals for most taxpayers younger than 59½. There is one job change exception: if the 
taxpayer leaves a DC plan and is 55 or older they can take the money out of that plan without penalty. There are also 
a handful of exceptions to the 10 percent penalty, including first-time home purchase (IRA), educational expenses 
(IRA), medical expenses (DC plan or IRA), health insurance expenses (IRA), or other specified emergencies. 
  
4 The estimates of retirement plan leakage currently used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007) for their retirement 
account simulations are taken from a paper by Hurd and Panis (1996) that is similar in spirit to this paper but based 
on the Health and Retirement Study. 
The empirical strategy in most of the previous research on retirement plan leakage 
involves using household survey data to study the disposition of retirement accounts for 
separating employees (Chang, 1996; Burman, Coe, and Gale, 1999; Engelhardt, 2002, 2003; 
Hurd and Panis, 2006; Congressional Research Service, 2009; Copeland, 2009a, 2009b). 5
The first general conclusion of the survey-based leakage studies is that the size of the 
distribution is a key determinant of the ultimate disposition. That is, very small distributions tend 
to be cashed out, while larger distributions are generally rolled over into another qualified 
account.
 This 
approach has the potential advantage of evaluating retirement dispositions in the context of the 
overall demographic, labor supply, and financial situation of the household. A number of 
common themes emerge from the studies based on household surveys, but there are empirical 
issues that suggest one should exercise caution when drawing inferences about overall leakage or 
even differences by type of household.  
6
However, household surveys fail to capture up to 70 percent of retirement account 
distributions in any given year, so using these estimates to draw inferences about overall leakage 
 Because of this pattern, it is not surprising to find the conclusion in this literature that 
“most people cash out, but most dollars are rolled over.” A second finding, highly correlated 
with the first, is that lower-income participants are more likely to cash out a distribution, which 
gives rise to concerns about distributional outcomes. Lower-income participants are likely to 
have contributed less to their plans to begin with, and if they are more likely to cash out when 
they separate from their employer, leakage is much more of a potential problem.   
                                                 
5 There is a closely related line of research on IRA drawdown behavior, which could in principle be studied in the 
general framework of “leakage.” See, for example, Bryant (2008), Holden and Reid (2008), Sabelhaus (2000), 
Sabelhaus and Schrass (2009).  
6 Measuring leakage using survey data is problematic for conceptual reasons as well, because some cash-outs go into 
other types of saving or repayment of loans. If those types of dispositions are counted as saving instead of leakage 
the estimates of non-leaked distributions roughly doubles (Engelhardt, 2003).  
or differences across types of families may be somewhat premature.7 Some of the failure to 
measure distributions occurs because household surveys that ask about retirement plan 
distributions when the employee separates from a job are missing leakage associated with in-plan 
hardship withdrawals. Also, the surveys are generally missing withdrawals from IRAs.8 It is also 
very likely that some participants separating from their employers and choosing direct rollovers 
to IRAs or other qualified accounts are simply failing to report those amounts as a distribution, 
because the rollover has no tax consequences.9
The fundamental shortcomings of household survey data are not a problem when using 
tax returns or other administrative data to study retirement plan leakage. Flows out of retirement 
plans and other qualified accounts can be comprehensively tracked using a combination of the 
primary personal income tax return (Form 1040), the information return for retirement account 
distributions (Form 1099-R), and the information return for IRAs (Form 5498). Thus, by using 
tax data one is able to observe all retirement account distributions, not just lump-sum payouts 
that occur at job change. Even data consistency can be effectively analyzed using the tax data, 
because, for example, a retirement account distribution generates a Form 1099-R along with (in 
principle) the appropriate entries on Form 1040. 
 
                                                 
7 Burman, Coe, and Gale (1999) arrive at the 70 percent figure by comparing their survey-based distributions with 
the tax-based estimates from Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999). Some of the difference is definitional, insofar as the 
survey is not designed to capture some of the flows tracked in the tax data, but that speaks to the point of why tax 
data are preferable for studying leakage.  
8 See Sabelhaus and Schrass (2009).  
9 Industry data reinforce the idea that employee perceptions or perhaps even awareness are a key to understanding 
why household surveys fail to properly measure distributions. Retirement account assets are often either left in the 
employer’s plan when the employee separates or directly rolled over to another qualified account without the money 
ever passing through the employee’s hands (Vanguard, 2010). 
One downside of using tax data is the relatively limited information about the taxpayers 
being studied.10
 
 However, as in previous work using linked information and primary tax returns, 
there are significant insights to be gained about the extent of both aggregate leakage and the 
distribution of leakage across some basic demographic characteristics (Sabelhaus and Weiner, 
1999). The tax and information returns themselves contain a significant amount of financial 
information about households, and marital status can be inferred based on filing status. In 
addition, the data file used here has age for both primary and secondary taxpayers, which makes 
it possible to evaluate retirement account distributions in a lifecycle context. It is true that the tax 
data do not permit one to study why a taxpayer behaves a certain way, but simply documenting 
how they behaved with respect to retirement plan distributions is a crucial first step.  
2. Trends in Aggregate Retirement Plan Leakage  
Employer-sponsored pension coverage in the private sector has been steadily changing 
composition from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans since the passage of 
ERISA in 1974 (Clark and Sabelhaus, 2009). Assets in DC plans are generally more susceptible 
to leakage, because employees often have access to their accumulated balances through loans 
and in-service withdrawals in addition to distributions at job separation.11
                                                 
10 Some of that missing information, for example the events associated with the pension withdrawal, are discernible 
in the panel data. Future research will involve using the panel to identify events like job change, marital dissolution, 
or changes in income that are likely associated with specific types of withdrawals.  
 Because DC plans 
have grown in prominence, leakage has potentially become a much larger problem. However, 
administrative and survey data from a variety of sources for the past two decades show no such 
upward trend in aggregate leakage, when measured relative to underlying DC balances or gross 
contributions to DC plans.  
11 In DB plans, pre-retirement access is generally limited to cash-outs of lump-sum distributions at job separation. 
Loans may be allowed in the DB setting, but Form 5500 data indicate that loan activity in DB plans is rare. 
The concept of leakage used in this section is meant to reflect taxable withdrawals prior 
to retirement, but data limitations make it necessary to use proxies to distinguish leakage from 
other taxable withdrawals. Those proxies are based on splitting the sample by characteristics 
such as the age of the taxpayer, the observation of a penalty on the distribution, and failure to 
repay loans in order to properly characterize the distribution as leakage or not.12 The primary 
threshold used for characterizing pre-retirement withdrawals as leakage is age 55, but results are 
also shown for all taxpayers up to age 60. Although most retirement plan participants continue 
working and contributing to their employer-sponsored retirement plans after age 55, that cutoff is 
important because the tax code permits non-penalized withdrawals from employer-sponsored 
plans after job separation for workers aged 55 or older. Above age 59½ workers can generally 
make penalty-free withdrawals from IRAs and DC retirement accounts whether they separate 
from their employer or not.13
In addition to age, the other attributes of IRA and pension withdrawals that can be 
tracked over time are whether or not a penalty is paid on the withdrawal, and whether or not the 
distribution reflected a failure to repay a loan (a so-called “deemed” distribution). In general, the 
penalty amount is 10 percent of the taxable portion of the distribution, so the inferred penalized 
distribution is set to ten times the reported penalty.
Again, most participants are still working and contributing at age 
60, but the age-based thresholds are a useful way to draw the line as to where a distribution goes 
from generally being considered leakage to generally being considered retirement income.  
14
                                                 
12 The cross-sectional information form data used in the next section make it possible to characterize distributions 
from qualified plans regardless of age, insofar as those distributions are directly or indirectly rolled over into other 
qualified accounts. However, in those data it is not possible to say for sure that a particular distribution is leakage, 
because (for example) distributions that are not rolled over are not necessarily spent. In any event, the time-series 
analysis here relies on data from Form 1040 where direct and indirect rollovers are not distinguishable.  
 The extent of deemed distributions can be 
measured comprehensively in the cross-sectional tax return data set used in the next section, but 
13 The tax code permits in-service withdrawals, but some plan sponsors do not.  
14 In practice this is a slight underestimate, because 10 percent is technically the largest penalty a taxpayer can face.  
in order to construct aggregate trends, the analysis in this section is restricted to private-sector 
DC plans. The data on deemed distributions from private-sector DC plans is available from the 
year 2000 and forward from the Department of Labor’s Form 5500 data series.15
In order to benchmark withdrawals over time one needs corresponding data on total DC 
and IRA assets by age. The denominators against which to benchmark trends in pre-retirement 
withdrawals are constructed using the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1992 
through 2007. The SCF is a household survey, and thus balances can be aggregated across 
several possible dimensions. For most of the leakage measures here that means tracking total 
retirement account balances by age over time. The total DC and IRA balances in the SCF track 
published aggregates over time (from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts and 
data from the Investment Company Institute) quite well, and thus the account balances by age are 
also assumed to be representative across age groups.  
  
Several measures of aggregate pre-retirement withdrawals relative to underlying assets 
suggest that leakage is very modest in all years, and if anything leakage has been trending down 
over time (Figure 1). The specific measures of leakage shown here are (1) penalized withdrawals 
relative to total DC and IRA assets for all ages, (2) penalized withdrawals for taxpayers younger 
than 55 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group, (3) total taxable withdrawals for 
taxpayers younger than 55 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group, and (4) total taxable 
withdrawals for taxpayers younger than 60 relative to DC and IRA assets for that age group.16
                                                 
15 The Private Pension Plan Bulletin is published annually by the U.S. Department of Labor, and is available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/form5500dataresearch.html. 
 
The various measures provide a fairly wide range for the leakage estimates, but the differences 
16 Throughout, the “age” for a joint tax return is set to the older of the primary and secondary taxpayers.  
are intuitive, and all support the assertion that aggregate leakage is modest and declining despite 
being biased towards overestimating leakage. 17
Penalized withdrawals are the narrowest concept of leakage considered in Figure 1. 
Overall, penalized withdrawals in 2007 were just over 0.5 percent of account balances, and that 
ratio has fallen over time. This statistic is arguably biased by the phasing in of the DC- and IRA- 
based retirement system over the past few decades, though, because the aging of the system has 
been associated with the aging of the typical participant in the system. To control for this, the 
second measure restricts the comparison to penalized withdrawals over account balances for 
taxpayers younger than age 55. Most of the penalty occurs for taxpayers younger than age 55, 
but they own less than half of the DC and IRA assets, so the penalized withdrawal to asset 
measure for this group is double that for the entire population. Still, at 1.2 percent of assets in 
2007, penalized withdrawals for the younger than 55 age group are relatively modest.  
 
The other measures shown in Figure 1 are based on total taxable withdrawals, which 
include penalized withdrawals, but also the non-penalized amounts taken out because of 
exceptions in the tax code (first-time home buying, hardship, and education) or the initiation of 
retirement income payouts (for those 55 to 59 years old). Adding non-penalized withdrawals 
raises the estimated leakage to asset ratio significantly, but again, the overall withdrawal rates are 
modest  at just over 2.0 percent for taxpayers younger than 55, and about 2.5 percent for 
taxpayers younger than 60. As with the penalized withdrawal percentages, overall taxable 
withdrawals relative to account balances have been declining over time.  
                                                 
17 In 1989 the ratio of total IRA and DC plan (or “thrift plans” in SCF terminology) assets in the SCF to Investment 
Company Institute published totals was 83 percent, and the ratio was 89 percent in 2007. Because the SCF totals are 
10 to 15 percent below the published aggregates, the estimates here of leakage relative to assets are biased upwards. 
The SCF totals are used as the denominator for total penalized withdrawals in addition to the age-specific measures 
to maintain a consistency across the measures in Figure 1. In addition, the denominator in these calculations is DC 
plan and IRA assets, and because some of the outflows are from DB plans, the leakage estimates are biased up even 
more.  
The gap between penalized and total withdrawals underscores the fact that the Form 1040 
tax data alone are not sufficient to characterize retirement account outflows as leakage—it is an 
upper bound for several reasons. Taxpayers could be shifting the money into other accounts 
(including Roth IRAs) or paying down debt, not necessarily spending it. Engelhardt (2002) refers 
to this distinction as “tax-qualified” versus “wealth-preserving” use of the distribution—he finds 
that the latter may be twice the former. Also, it is useful to keep in mind that although taking a 
withdrawal in order to pay for education is a form of leakage, it does not mean that it is an 
undesirable outcome.  
 The perspective one gains from considering overall penalized and non-penalized 
withdrawals for pre-retirees gives a sense that leakage is modest and trending down, and that 
impression is reinforced by looking at aggregate leakage relative to aggregate contributions 
(Figure 2). Although there is no single data source that tracks aggregate DC and IRA 
contributions, it is possible to piece together new contributions from a variety of sources.18
                                                 
18 The denominator in Figure 2 includes new contributions to DC plans from the Department of Labor’s Form 5500 
data series (see footnote 15), unpublished data on contributions to the federal employee Thrift Saving Plan, and tax-
deductible IRA contributions from the IRS Statistics of Income. The key missing contribution flows are 
contributions to state and local government 457 retirement plans and non-profit 403(b) plans. 
 The 
numerator used to compare leakage with new contributions is the narrow total penalized 
withdrawals measure repeated from Figure 1, in order to avoid any contagion from using total 
taxable withdrawals that may be associated with retirement or portfolio shifts. In that sense, 
Figure 2 presents a direct answer to the question: for every dollar that goes into the DC and IRA 
system, how many cents leak out through penalized withdrawals in the same year? The answer 
for the past twenty years has been a remarkably steady 14 percent or 15 percent of gross inflows 
leaking out. Although the data series is somewhat limited from a time perspective, the two 
business cycle troughs (1991 and 2000) are associated with a higher penalized withdrawal to 
contribution ratios. 
 The final component of the aggregate trend analysis in this section focuses on one source 
of possible leakage, loans from retirement plans. It is important to note that loans themselves are 
not a form of leakage, though they can lead to leakage directly if the participant separates and 
fails to repay the loan (or lowers subsequent contributions, but that effect cannot be measured 
directly). In any event, loans relative to private-sector DC plan assets are relatively small and 
stable over time, and the amount of “deemed” distributions from failure to repay loans is also 
small and stable (Figure 3).19
 
 The actual leakage relative to balances is thus the product of two 
small and stable ratios, which is a tiny and stable fraction of plan assets. In 2007, only 0.02 
percent of private-sector DC plan assets leaked out because of a failure to repay loans.  
3. The Distribution of Retirement Plan Leakage 
 Even though aggregate retirement plan leakage seems modest and declining over time, 
leakage may still be an issue of possible concern from a distributional perspective. That is, in any 
given year, the leakage that does occur may be concentrated among lower-income workers, 
which would suggest that financial mistakes could be undermining retirement security for the 
most vulnerable part of the population. In fact, a careful inspection of the distribution of 
retirement plan leakage using a combination of tax returns and information returns (Forms 1099-
R and 5498) shows that leakage is actually distributed across income groups, and, after 
controlling for income, even surprisingly balanced across pre-retirement age groups.  
                                                 
19 The Form 5500 data report negligible amounts of participant loans and deemed distributions of participant loans 
in private-sector DB plans (see U.S. Department of Labor 2010). Those are not analyzed here.  
 The analysis of the distribution of leakage presented here is based on a sequential 
analysis of withdrawal activity, and the specific steps are driven somewhat by data limitations. In 
a world of perfect data, researchers would have access to panel data that tracks retirement plan 
coverage along with contributions to and withdrawals from retirement accounts. The perfect data 
set would also have the key socioeconomic information needed to study how behavior varies 
across population subgroups. The SOI tax return data used here is cross-sectional, and basic 
demographics (age and filing status) along with reported income on tax returns are the only 
controls available.  
A key missing piece of the puzzle is micro data on retirement plan contributions. Using 
information returns along with Form 1040 makes it possible to measure employee contributions 
to retirement plans, because those contributions show up as deferred compensation on the W-2. 
However, the W-2 does not track employer contributions, which the aggregate data suggest are 
significant—about 40 percent of total private-sector DC plan contributions, based on Form 5500 
data.20 Thus, it is not possible to directly construct the same sort of “net contributions” estimate 
across age and income groups using the micro data that was presented above for the aggregate 
trend analysis.21
Instead, the approach to distributional analysis here relies on identifying whether the 
taxpayer might be exposed to retirement plan leakage by virtue of having retirement coverage or 
retirement accounts, then calculating the percent of those exposed to leakage who actually 
experienced gross or taxable distributions, and then calculating the average fraction of the gross 
distribution that can be considered possible leakage. The key to the distributional insights is that 
even after controlling for coverage and/or retirement account ownership, the propensity to have a 
  
                                                 
20 See footnote 15 for a description of the Form 5500 data. 
21 One possible strategy is to use micro data on employee and employer contributions to retirement plans from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances. Those data will be an important component of the next steps in this research agenda.  
distribution and the fraction of any gross distribution that is taxable are fairly stable across 
income groups.  
 The starting point for the distributional analysis is acknowledging that retirement plan 
coverage varies across tax filers, by age, income, and married versus single filing status (Figures 
4a and 4b). The criteria for being exposed to possible leakage is that the tax filing unit (the tax 
return) have one or more of the following: evidence of employer-sponsored retirement plan 
coverage on Form W-2, evidence of an IRA with a positive balance on Form 5498, or evidence 
of an actual distribution from a qualified retirement plan on Form 1099-R. This inclusive 
approach to identifying taxpayers exposed to retirement plan leakage means, for example, that a 
particular taxpayer need not have current coverage—they are included even if all they have is a 
withdrawal from a plan in which they (or a spouse) was previously covered. Indeed, this 
selection decision has a big impact on the withdrawal-to-income estimates presented later, 
because many of those who are filing in the current year have only the retirement account 
distribution, and thus show up in the lower-income groups and are characterized as having 
leakage that represents 100 percent of their income. 
 Retirement plan participation rises with both income and age in the younger than 60 
population (Figure 4a). Overall, 60 percent of tax returns filed by this group include some 
indication of coverage, but that ranges from just under 20 percent for the lowest income deciles 
up to nearly 100 percent for the highest income deciles. The coverage estimates also show a 
consistent positive age effect, especially for the lower-income groups. These patterns reflect a 
typical lifecycle story of retirement plan participation, insofar as participation rises with both 
income and age, with income being the more dominant factor.  
 Although the pattern of retirement plan participation seems to rise linearly across income 
deciles when joint and single returns are viewed together, that pattern masks an important 
subtlety when the two are separated (Figure 4b).22
 Having narrowed down the tax-filing population to include only those filers who are 
possibly exposed to leakage, the next step is to determine what percentage of each age, income, 
and filing status group actually received a qualified distribution during the year (Figures 5a, 5b). 
Overall, 24 percent of tax filers with evidence of participation received a distribution. The 
overall patterns of gross distribution events by income has a slight u-shape within any given age 
group (and for all age groups younger than 60 combined) but the range is within a few 
percentage points of the overall average for the group. The slightly higher rate of gross 
distributions for lower-income tax returns may reflect a sampling effect, meaning those tax units 
would not have filed a return had it not been for the gross distribution.  
 Joint filers are considered to have coverage if 
either the primary or secondary filer meets one of the three criteria laid out above. The data show 
that single filers are always less likely to have retirement plan participation than joint filers—
overall the percentages with coverage are 78 percent and 49 percent. The joint returns also 
exhibit a very different pattern of coverage across income groups, with participation rising much 
more steeply as income increases from the lowest decile, with well over half of tax filers in the 
middle income deciles participating in (or having had participated in) some sort of qualified 
account. 
Although the differences in the incidence of distributions by income group are modest, 
there is a significant increase in the probability of having a gross distribution (conditional on 
                                                 
22 The income deciles for joint and single returns are determined separately, and as expected, the distribution cutoffs 
for joint filers are much higher. Thus, tabulating using one set of decile breaks would push a disproportionate share 
of single filers into the lower income decile groups, and a disproportionate share of the joint filers into the upper-
income groups.  
participating in a retirement plan) as age increases. Differences in receipt of gross distributions 
by age and filing status do not add much in the way of insights about the likelihood of 
distributions, though there is some evidence that the very high rate of gross distributions among 
the lower-income part of the oldest age group (55 to 59) is driven by single filers. 
 Not every tax payer receiving a gross distribution has a taxable distribution, because 
many roll the entire distribution over to another qualified account. Overall, about two-thirds of 
the taxpayers younger than 60 with gross distributions indicate that at least part of the 
distribution is taxable (Figures 6a, 6b). The variation in incidence of taxable distributions by 
income is a muted version of the gross distribution pattern, which is another way of saying that 
the ratio of taxable to gross distribution incidence does not exhibit a lot of variation by income. 
The characteristic more strongly correlated with taxable distributions is age. About 75 percent of 
those with a gross distribution in the 55 to 59 age group are at least partially taxable.  
 The higher rate of taxable distributions for some taxpayers may reflect a sample selection 
effect. That is, a lower-income single filer, especially in the 55 to 59 age range, may be filing a 
tax return only because they have a qualified distribution—otherwise, they would not have been 
required to file a return. If the tax filer has no other income, and only the taxable portion of the 
qualified distribution shows up in AGI, then they are characterized as being a lower-income 
person who is experiencing significant leakage relative to income. This potential problem 
underscores the need to use the panel dimension of the SOI to better classify the particular tax 
filer (they might have higher income in other years) and to help understand why the withdrawal 
is their only source of income (they might have just experienced a divorce).   
A better understanding of the role of leakage relative to income involves two more steps. 
The first question is how much of the gross distribution actually becomes taxable? There are 
several possible outcomes when a participant receives a gross distribution (Table 1). Overall, for 
tax filers younger than 60, taxable distributions are 38.0 percent of gross distributions, and 
amount to 2.5 percent of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). The lion’s share of the non-taxable 
amount reflects a direct rollover from one qualified account to another. Some distributions can 
be characterized as “indirect rollovers” because there is evidence of a gross distribution which 
the tax filer did not report as taxable, and for which there is an unexplained inflow to an IRA 
reported on the Form 5498.  
The other types of non-taxable rollovers include non-taxable Roth distributions, return of 
after-tax contributions to qualified plans, Section 1035 exchanges (involving the purchase of 
annuities and other qualified insurance products), and a residual “other” category where there is 
no information return-based explanation for why the taxpayer did not report the distribution as 
taxable. There are many explanations for why that might occur, but it is possible that some of 
those (inferred) non-taxable distributions reflect inconsistencies between the information returns 
and Form 1040 due to non-reporting of cash-outs.  
 The overall ratio of taxable to gross distributions is 38 percent, but the more interesting 
distributional question is how that propensity to cash out a distribution varies by age, income, 
and filing status. One of the most striking findings in the data is the nearly flat ratio of taxable to 
gross distributions across these dimensions (Figures 7a, 7b). If anything, there is a slight inverted 
u-shape to the cash-out percentages across income groups, with those in the middle of the 
income distribution exhibiting higher cash-out rates than in either tail. Cash-out rates are 
noticeably lower for the highest income group and generally lower for joint filers at any given 
age and income combination, but the bulk of the cash-out ratios across the groups fall into the 30 
percent to 50 percent range.  
 The final step is characterizing taxable distributions relative to AGI across age, income, 
and filing status groups (Figures 8a, 8b).The effect of selecting on tax filers is evident—the 
older/lower income groups have high taxable withdrawals to AGI ratios, but that is in part due to 
the fact that some of the tax filers in the sample are there only because they had taxable 
distributions. The overall ratio of taxable withdrawals to AGI for the under-60 population is 2.5 
percent, but it is much lower (1.0 percent, 1.5 percent, and 1.9 percent) for the younger than 35, 
35 to 44, and 45 to 54 groups, respectively. Overall, these distributional estimates of taxable 
withdrawals relative to income are consistent with the aggregate estimates presented above.23
 
  
4. Conclusions 
There are several ways to think about what retirement plan “leakage” means, and how to 
measure leakage given available data. The estimates here suggest that leakage is very low 
relative to aggregate retirement account balances: In 1992, at most 3.9 percent of assets were 
distributed prematurely; in 2007, only at most 2.5 percent were distributed prematurely. System-
wide, penalized withdrawals ran at most perhaps 15 percent of new contributions in any given 
year. In 2007, only 16 percent of tax returns with employer-sponsored retirement plan coverage 
or IRA ownership had leakage activity, that is, taxable withdrawals prior to age 60.  
From a distributional perspective, tax returns show that the presence of employer-
sponsored retirement plan coverage or IRA ownership tends to rise with age and income. Tax 
returns of younger individuals were less likely to have taxable distributions compared with tax 
returns of older individuals. Incidence of taxable distribution activity varied little by income, 
                                                 
23 Aggregate penalized withdrawals are about 15 percent of contributions in any given year, and taxable withdrawals 
are just about double penalized withdrawals. Taxable withdrawals to AGI range from 1.0 to 1.9 percent. Given that 
overall contributions (from Figure 2) are running about six percent of AGI (from the data underlying Figures 5 
through 8) the three to one ratio of contributions to leakage is approximately confirmed. 
with the exception of the lowest income deciles, which have higher propensity to have 
distributions (but there is an endogeneity problem that they filed only because of the 
distribution).  
When attempting to evaluate the extent of leakage, it is important to keep in mind that an 
individual’s willingness to participate in and contribute to retirement accounts in the first place is 
to some extent dependent on their ability to access those savings prior to retirement in the event 
of economic need. Auto enrollment and other innovations in pension arrangements may well 
affect this tradeoff going forward, but the tension between participating today and having an 
option to cash out early if needed is likely to remain an important feature of the pension 
landscape. Thus, when judging “leakage,” one needs to be cognizant of the fact that there might 
not have been anything to leak out in the first place if policy were much more restrictive. Or as 
Shakespeare might have said: ‘Tis better to have saved and leaked, than never to have saved at 
all.  
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Figure 5a.  Percent of Covered Tax Returns with Gross Distributions by Age and Adjusted 
Gross Income (AGI)
Age <35 Age 35-44
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Figure 6a.  Percent of Covered Tax Returns with Taxable Distributions by Age and Adjusted 
Gross Income (AGI)
Age <35 Age 35-44
Age 45-54 Age 55-59
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Figure 7a.  Ratio of Taxable Distributions to Gross Distributions by Age and Adjusted Gross 
Income (AGI)
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Source: Tax Year 2007 Statistics of Income Individual Complete Report Matched Form 1040, Form 5498, and Form 1099R File 
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Figure 8a  Ratio of Taxable Distributions to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) by Age and AGI
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Table 1. Gross and Taxable Distributions from Qualified Retirement Accounts for Taxpayers Above and Below Age 60 
Billions of dollars 
        All Taxpayers Age  Less Than 60 Age 60 and Older 
Taxpayers with Gross Distributions         
          
  Gross Distributions    $1,157.8 $348.9 $808.9 
      
 
  
  - Non Taxable Distributions    $489.5 $214.4 $275.1 
       Direct rollovers to other qualified accounts    335.8 172.5 163.3 
       Indirect rollovers to other qualified accounts    6.8 2.3 4.4 
       Non-taxable distributions from Roth accounts    4.8 0.8 4.1 
       Return of after-tax contributions to qualified plans    59.1 14.4 44.6 
       Section 1035 exchanges    49.5 8.9 40.6 
       Other non-taxable distributions    33.1 15.3 17.8 
    
 
    
  = Taxable Distributions    $661.8 $132.7 $529.1 
       Non-Penalized    612.2 85.8 526.4 
       Penalized    49.5 46.9 2.7 
   
  
 Addendum 
              
  Number of returns with qualified coverage (thousands)   87,925 62,114 25,811 
  Number of returns with gross distributions (thousands)   36,065 15,057 21,008 
  Gross distributions as a percent of AGI for covered   15.7% 6.7% 37.2% 
  Taxable distributions as a percent of AGI for covered   9.0% 2.5% 24.3% 
  Taxable distributions as a percent of gross distributions   52.9% 13.4% 0.3% 
     Notes: Age for joint returns is based on the older of the primary or secondary taxpayer. Excludes dependent filers. 
Source: Tax Year 2007 Statistics of Income Individual Complete Report Matched Form 1040, Form 5498, and Form 1099-R File  
     
      
